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Abstract. Autoencoders (AE) have recently been widely employed to
approach the novelty detection problem. Trained only on the normal
data, the AE is expected to reconstruct the normal data effectively while
fail to regenerate the anomalous data, which could be utilized for nov-
elty detection. However, in this paper, it is demonstrated that this does
not always hold. AE often generalizes so perfectly that it can also recon-
struct the anomalous data well. To address this problem, we propose a
novel AE that can learn more semantically meaningful features. Specif-
ically, we exploit the fact that adversarial robustness promotes learning
of meaningful features. Therefore, we force the AE to learn such fea-
tures by penalizing networks with a bottleneck layer that is unstable
against adversarial perturbations. We show that despite using a much
simpler architecture in comparison to the prior methods, the proposed
AE outperforms or is competitive to state-of-the-art on three benchmark
datasets.
Keywords: Novelty detection, Autoencoder, Adversarial Robust Train-
ing, Adversarial attacks
1 Introduction
In many real-world problems, it is easy to gather normal data from the operating
behavior of a system. However, collecting data from the same system in situa-
tions where it malfunctions or is being used clumsily may be difficult or even
impossible. For instance, in a surveillance camera that captures daily activity
in an environment, almost all frames are related to the normal behavior. This
means that data associated with the anomalous behavior is difficult to obtain
from such cameras. Anomaly/novelty detection refers to the set of solutions for
such settings.
The key point in the definition of anomaly detection is the outlier notion.
In the literature, An outlier is defined as a data point that deviates from the
bulk of the remaining data [5, 14]. Assuming that the normal data is generated
by a distribution, the goal is to detect whether a new unseen observation is
drawn from this distribution or not. In the context of anomaly detection, some
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terms are used interchangeably. Outlier detection, abnormal detection, and nov-
elty detection are some of the terms that are widely used in this context. While
these terms seem to convey identical concepts, they are slightly different. Out-
lier or anomaly detection refers to the tasks where the training data includes
both outliers and inliers. The goal of the estimator is then to learn a represen-
tation of compact regions in the feature space, where most of the normal data
points are laid in. This representation is then used to identify the deviant ob-
servations as outliers. However, in novelty detection problems, only the normal
data is used for the model training [5, 6]. In this work, we assume the novelty
detection setting and propose a novel method that achieves results that are com-
petitive or superior to state-of-the-art despite its simplicity. In prior work, AE
and Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) were extensively applied for novelty
detection [2, 24, 27, 29].
In GAN-based approaches, one tries to train a model that could adversarially
generate realistic images from the normal class. This means that if the model
fails to generate a given input image, the input would probably be an anomalous
one. However, GAN-based approaches face some challenges during the training.
These include mode collapse that happens when the generator maps several
inputs to a single image in the output space. In GAN, complete mode collapse is
rare, while a partial collapse occurs more frequently [11, 17]. Furthermore, high
sensitivity of the training to the choices of hyperparameters, non-convergence
problem, parameter oscillation, and non-reproducible results due to the unstable
training are counted as the other challenges in training of the GAN [22,28].
On the other hand, AE is more convenient to train and gives results that are
easier to reproduce. Therefore, we investigate AE-based approaches in this paper.
An AE, which has learned features that are mostly unique to the normal class,
could reconstruct the normal data perfectly, while when given an anomalous
data, it either reconstructs a corrupted or a normal output; In the former case,
the anomalous input is likely to have disjoint features compared to the normal
class, while in the latter, the input may resemble a normal data in some aspects.
Note that in both cases, unlike for the normal data, the reconstruction Mean
Squared Error (MSE) is high for the anomalous data. This means that for such
an AE, we could threshold the reconstruction loss to distinguish the normal vs.
anomalous data. One could alternatively leverage a discriminator that is applied
to the reconstructed image to distinguish between the anomalous and normal
data [18, 27]. In any case, as mentioned, an important premise for the AE to
work is that it learns mostly unique features to the normal class. We call such
features “semantically meaningful” or “robust”, contrasted with generic low level
features that are subject to change in presence of noise, in the rest of the paper.
A common problem in using AE for novelty detection is its generalization
ability to reconstruct some anomaly inputs, when they share common features
with the normal class [10,45]. Although this generalization property is useful in
other contexts, such as restoration [21], it is considered as a drawback in novelty
detection. In other papers [13, 31, 43], the main underlying assumption behind
the AE-based approaches is that the reconstruction error is high when the model
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is given an anomalous data, which as mentioned does not seem to be holding
perfectly.
There are two reasons why the main underlying assumption in these methods
does not hold necessarily. First, the model behavior when facing the anomalous
data is not observed and is not therefore predictable. Second, the learned latent
space may capture mostly the features that are in common between the normal
and anomalous data. When given the anomalous data, this would likely yield a
perfectly reconstructed anomalous data. To address these issues, we aimed for
a solution that learns an adversarially robust latent space, where the focus is
on learning unique or semantically meaningful features of the normal inputs and
their nuances. This could prevent the decoder from reconstructing the anomalies.
It is shown in [20] that small imperceptible changes in the input can easily
fool a deep neural network classifier. AE’s are subject to such attacks as well.
This stems from the fact that a deep classifier or an AE would likely learn low
level or brittle non-robust features [15]. Low level features could be exploited
to reconstruct any given image perfectly. Hence, the presence of such features
seems to violate the main underlying assumption of the earlier work for novelty
detection that is based on AE. Therefore, we propose to train an adversarially
robust AE to overcome this issue. In Fig. 1, reconstructions from Denoising
Autoencoder (DAE) and the proposed method are shown. Here, the normal
data is considered to be the number 8 in the MNIST dataset and the models are
trained only on the normal category. As opposed to the proposed Adversarially
Robust trained Autoencoder (ARAE), DAE generalizes and reconstructs the
number 1 perfectly. This is not desired in the novelty detection problem. This
means that the latent space of DAE has learned features that are not necessarily
meaningful.
Fig. 1: Unlike DAE, ARAE that is trained on the normal class, which is the
digit 8, reconstructs a normal instance when it is given an anomalous digit, from
the class 1. The first row shows the input images. The second and third rows
show DAE and ARAE reconstructions of the corresponding inputs, respectively.
ARAE is trained based on bounded ℓ∞, ℓ2, rotation, and translation perturba-
tions.
To train a robust AE for the novelty detection task, a new objective func-
tion based on adversarial attacks is proposed. The novel AE which is based on a
simple architecture, is evaluated on the MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and COIL-100
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datasets. We will next review existing approaches in more details, and then de-
scribe our proposed idea along with its evaluation. We demonstrate that despite
the simplicity of the underlying model, the proposed model outperforms or stays
competitive with state-of-the-art in novelty detection.
2 Related work
As explained earlier in the introduction, methods that are used in the literature
are classified into two main categories: (1) modeling the normal behavior in the
latent space; and (2) thresholding the AE reconstruction error. Of course, a
hybrid of these two approaches was also considered in the field.
OCGAN [44], takes the second approach, i.e. it is based on the MSE distance
between the AE output and its input. An underlying assumption in this work
is that the training data may contain abnormal samples. Therefore, the method
tries to identify these samples throughout the training process. It finally uses
only the reconstruction error in the test time. As an extension to the AE-based
methods, in [24], a model is introduced in which the AE is trained by using
4 GANs, a classifier, and the “negative sample mining” technique. Here, both
the encoder and decoder of the AE are considered as generators in the GAN.
At the inference time, the method only uses MSE between the model output
and input to make a prediction. The authors attempted to force the encoder
output distribution to be approximately uniform. They also forced the decoder
output distribution to resemble the normal input distribution in the whole latent
domain. This is expected to result in a higher MSE distance between the decoder
output and input for the abnormal data. This method achieved state-of-the-art
results at the time of presentation.
[1] and [27] are the other examples in the AE-based approaches, except that
in [1], additionally, the probability distribution over the latent space was ob-
tained for the normal input data. Then, in the test time, the probability of a
sample being normal, which is called the “surprise score”, is added to the re-
construction error before the thresholding happens. [45] used a similar approach
to [1], except that the probability distribution of the normal data in the latent
space is not obtained by an auto-regressive model, but is computed by a Gaus-
sian Mixture Model. One of the benefits of this method is the ability to train the
deep network in an end-to-end manner to implement the EM algorithm. During
the test, a vector, which is summarizing the reconstruction error in AE using
various distance metrics is computed and concatenated to the AE latent feature
vector. Then, the resulting vector is fed into an estimator network that detects
the normal data based on a proposed energy criteria. In [27], there is a possibility
of using the discriminator output, which is a real number between zero and one,
as an alternative to the MSE distance in order to find the anomaly score. This
is done by considering the AE as the generator in the GAN framework.
Following the first general approach of modeling the normal behavior in the
latent space, [12] uses Variational Autoencoder (VAE) for training and attempts
to find disentangled latent features in order to model the inter-class and intra-
class variations of normal samples in disjoint dimensions. Then, it only uses the
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encoder output as input to a classifier to detect the abnormal data. In [25], a
GAN is initially used to obtain the latent space, then the probability distribution
of the normal class over the latent space is considered to be as the multiplication
of two marginal distributions, which are learned empirically. [26] (DSVDD) tries
to model the normal latent space with the presumption that all normal data
can be compressed into a hyper-sphere. This framework can be considered as a
combination of Deep Learning and classical models such as [7] (One-class SVM),
that has the advantage of extracting more relevant features from the training
data than the above-mentioned [7] because the whole network training process is
done in an end-to-end procedure. In [29], a GAN framework is used to model the
latent space. It is assumed that if the test data is normal, then a sample could be
found in a latent space such that the corresponding image that is made by the
generator is classified as real by the GAN discriminator. It should be noted that
the method needs to solve an optimization problem at the test time in order to
find the corresponding latent features of a given input. This, however, prevents
the inference procedure from being real-time.
3 Method
As we discussed earlier, the main problem of AE is its strong generalization
ability. We observe that DAE does not necessarily learn distinctive features of
the normal class. To remedy this problem, our approach is to force the AE
latent space implicitly to model only unique features of the normal class. To
make this happen, the framework for adversarial robustness, which is proposed
in [15,20], is adopted. We propose to successively craft adversarial examples and
then utilize them to train the AE. Adversarial examples are considered as those
irrelevant small changes in the input that destabilize the latent encoding. We
will next describe the details of the proposed adversarial training in the following
sections.
3.1 Adversarial Examples Crafting
In a semantically meaningful latent space, two highly perceptually similar sam-
ples should share similar feature encodings. Therefore, searching for a sample
X∗ that is perceptually similar to a sample X , but has a distant latent encoding
from that of X , leads us to an adversarial sample. As opposed to the normal
sample X , the adversarial sample X∗ is very likely to have a high reconstruction
loss, thus it would be detected as abnormal by the AE, despite being perceptu-
ally similar to a normal sample. Therefore, based on this intuition, the following
method is used to craft the adversarial samples.
At the training epoch i, we craft a set of adversarial samples Si(adv) based on
the initial training dataset S. For this purpose, we slightly perturb each sample
X ∈ S to craft an adversarial sample X∗ that has two properties: (1) X∗ is
perceptually similar to X , through controlling the ℓ∞ distance of X and X
∗; (2)
X∗ latent encoding is as far as possible from that of X . This is equivalent to
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solving the following optimization problem:
max
δX
Llatent s.t. ‖δX‖∞ ≤ ǫ, where Llatent = ‖Enc(X + δX)− Enc(X)‖
2
2 . (1)
In this formulation, ‖ . ‖p is the ℓp-norm, ǫ is the attack magnitude, and
X∗ = X + δX is the adversarial sample. We solve this optimization problem for
each sample X ∈ S using the Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [20] method,
to obtain Si(adv).
3.2 Autoencoder Adversarial Training
To train the AE using the crafted dataset Si(adv) in the previous section, we
propose the following loss function:
LAE = Lrec. + γLlatent (2)
where γ is a balancing hyperparameter, Llatent refers to the loss function that is
introduced in Eq. 1 and Lrec. corresponds to the following loss function:
Lrec. = ‖X −Dec(Enc(X
∗))‖22 . (3)
At each step, the AE is trained one epoch on the adversarial crafted samples
using this loss function. The training procedure is demonstrated in Fig. 2. In the
Fig. 2: The training procedure of our method. Llatent and Lrec. are obtained
using the MSE distance and used to form LAE.
training procedure, the Lrec. term forces the AE to reconstruct the adversarial
samples properly, while the Llatent term forces the adversarial samples to have
closer representations to that of the corresponding normal samples in the latent
space. We observe that the encoder decreases Llatent to a limited extent by merely
encoding the whole input space into a compact latent space. Too compact latent
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space results in a high Lrec., which is not achievable when the network is trained
using LAE. To summarize, the whole training procedure is trying to solve the
following saddle point problem [35]:
δ∗X := argmax
‖δX‖∞≤ǫ
Llatent(X, δX ,W )
min
W
EX [γLlatent(X, δ
∗
X ,W ) + Lrec.(X, δ
∗
X ,W )] ,
(4)
where W is denoted as the AE weights. Note that it was shown that the
adversarial training could not be solved in a single shot by the Stochastic Gra-
dient Descent (SGD), and one instead should try other optimization algorithms
such as the PGD. This relies on Danskin theorem to solve the inner optimization
followed by the outer optimization [20].
4 Experiments
In this section, we evaluate our method, which is denoted by ARAE, and compare
it with state-of-the-art on common benchmark datasets that are used for the
unsupervised novelty detection task. We show that even though our method
is based on a simple and efficient architecture, it performs competitively with
state-of-the-art approaches. The results are based on several evaluation strategies
that are used in the literature. All results that are reported in this paper are
reproducible by our publicly available implementation in the Keras framework
[8]1.
4.1 Experimental Setup
Datasets. We evaluate our method on MNIST [19], Fashion-MNIST [38], and
COIL-100 [23] datasets. Next, we briefly introduce each of these datasets.
– MNIST: This dataset contains 70,000 28 × 28 grayscale handwritten digits
from 0 to 9.
– Fashion-MNIST: A dataset similar to MNIST with 70,000 28× 28 grayscale
images of 10 fashion product categories.
– COIL-100: A dataset of 7200 color images of 100 different object classes.
Each class contains 72 images of one object captured in different poses. We
downscale the images of this dataset to the size 32× 32.
Protocols. To carry out the training-testing procedure, we need to define the
data partitions. For MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, one class is considered as the
normal class and samples from the other classes are assumed to be anoma-
lous. For COIL-100, we randomly take n classes as the normal classes, where
n ∈ {1, 4, 7}, and use the samples from the remaining classes as the anoma-
lous samples. For the mentioned dataset, this process is repeated 30 times and
1 https://github.com/rohban-lab/Salehi_submitted_2020
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the results are averaged. To form the training and testing data, there are two
protocols that are commonly used in the framework of unsupervised novelty
detection [24, 25, 27], which are as follows:
– Protocol 1: The original training-testing splits of the dataset are merged,
shuffled, and 80% of the normal class samples are used to train the model.
The remaining 20% forms some specified portion of the testing data. The
other portion is formed by randomly sampling from the anomalous classes.
– Protocol 2: The original training-testing splits of the dataset are used to train
and test the model. The training is carried out using the normal samples and
the entire testing data is used for evaluation.
We compare our method to other approaches using Area Under the Curve (AUC)
of the Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) curve, the F1 score, and the
False Positive Rate (FPR) at 99.5% True Positive Rate (TPR). Here, we let the
positive class be the anomalous one unless otherwise specified.
Architecture and Hyperparameters. Our AE uses a 3-layer fully connected
network with layer sizes of (512, 256, 128), following the input-layer to encode
the input. A decoder, whose architecture is mirroring that of the encoder, is used
to reconstruct the output. Each layer of the network is followed by a sigmoid
activation. For datasets with complex and detailed images like COIL-100 and
Fashion-MNIST, the hyperparameter ǫ, which is the maximum perturbation ℓ∞
norm as defined in Eq. 4, is set to 0.05, while for MNIST it is set to 0.2. The
hyperparameter γ, defined in Eq. 4, is always set to 0.1.
4.2 Results
We present our AUC results for MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets in Tables
1 and 2. The tables contain AUC values for each class as the normal class,
which were achieved using protocol 2. We compare our results against current
state-of-the-art and baseline methods. We train a DAE, as a baseline method,
with a random uniform noise between 0 and 0.1 using the same network as the
one that is used in our approach. AUC values of some methods were obtained
from [24,36].
Furthermore, in Table 3 we compare our results for the COIL-100 dataset
to the results reported in [25]. This table contains AUC and F1 values for n ∈
{1, 4, 7}, where n is the number of normal classes. We use protocol 1 for this
dataset. For each n ∈ {1, 4, 7}, the percentage of the anomalous samples in the
training data is defined in the table. The F1 score is reported for the threshold
value that is maximizing it.
As shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3, we achieve state-of-the-art results in all of
these datasets while using a simpler architecture compared to other state-of-the-
art methods, such as OCGAN, LSA, GPND, and R-graph.
We also evaluate our method using the F1 score on the MNIST dataset
in Table 4. In order to do this, we use the F1 scores reported in [25]. In this
experiment, the normal class is the positive one. We use protocol 1 and vary the
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anomaly percentage between 10% and 50%. We use 20% of the training samples
and sample from the anomalous classes to form a validation set with the same
anomaly percentage as the testing data. This validation set is used to find the
threshold that maximizes the F1 score.
As shown in Fig. 3 (left), we achieve slightly lower F1 scores compared to
that of GPND. However, this figure shows the low impact of the percentage of
anomalous data on our method performance.
FPR values at 99.5% TPR of MNIST dataset for ARAE and DAE are re-
ported in Table 5 and compared in Fig. 3 (right). As reported in the table, ARAE
decreases the FPR value by more than half in classes 0, 3, and 6.
Table 1: AUC values for the MNIST dataset. The values were obtained for each
class using protocol 2.
Method 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mean
VAE [16] 98.5 99.7 94.3 91.6 94.5 92.9 97.7 97.5 86.4 96.7 95.0
OCSVM [7] 99.5 99.9 92.6 93.6 96.7 95.5 98.7 96.6 90.3 96.2 96.0
AnoGAN [29] 96.6 99.2 85.0 88.7 89.4 88.3 94.7 93.5 84.9 92.4 91.3
DSVDD [26] 98.0 99.7 91.7 91.9 94.9 88.5 98.3 94.6 93.9 96.5 94.8
MTQM [36] 99.5 99.8 95.3 96.3 96.6 96.2 99.2 96.9 95.5 97.7 97.3
OCGAN [24] 99.8 99.9 94.2 96.3 97.5 98.0 99.1 98.1 93.9 98.1 97.5
LSA [1] 99.3 99.9 95.9 96.6 95.6 96.4 99.4 98.0 95.3 98.1 97.5
DAE 99.6 99.9 93.9 93.5 96.4 94.3 99.0 95.8 89.1 97.5 95.9
ARAE 99.8 99.9 96.0 97.2 97.0 97.4 99.5 96.9 92.4 98.5 97.5
Table 2: AUC values for the Fashion-MNIST dataset. The values were obtained
for each class using protocol 2.
Method 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mean
VAE [16] 87.4 97.7 81.6 91.2 87.2 91.6 73.8 97.6 79.5 96.5 88.4
OCSVM [7] 91.9 99.0 89.4 94.2 90.7 91.8 83.4 98.8 90.3 98.2 92.8
DAGMM [45] 30.3 31.1 47.5 48.1 49.9 41.3 42.0 37.4 51.8 37.8 41.7
DSEBM [42] 89.1 56.0 86.1 90.3 88.4 85.9 78.2 98.1 86.5 96.7 85.5
MTQM [36] 92.2 95.8 89.9 93.0 92.2 89.4 84.4 98.0 94.5 98.3 92.8
LSA [1] 91.6 98.3 87.8 92.3 89.7 90.7 84.1 97.7 91.0 98.4 92.2
DAE 92.6 99.2 90.3 93.8 91.8 91.6 83.4 98.7 90.7 97.6 92.9
ARAE 93.7 99.1 91.1 94.4 92.3 91.4 83.6 98.9 93.9 97.9 93.6
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Table 3: AUC and F1 values for the COIL-100 dataset. The values were obtained
using protocol 1 for n ∈ {1, 4, 7} and different anomaly percentages.
OutlierPursuit DPCP l1 thresholding R-graph GPND DAE ARAE
[39] [33] [30] [40] [25]
Normal samples: one category of images, Anomalous samples: 50%
AUC 0.908 0.900 0.991 0.997 0.968 0.997 0.998
F1 0.902 0.882 0.978 0.990 0.979 0.994 0.993
Normal samples: four category of images, Anomalous samples: 25%
AUC 0.837 0.859 0.992 0.996 0.945 0.990 0.997
F1 0.686 0.684 0.941 0.970 0.960 0.950 0.973
Normal samples: seven category of images, Anomalous samples: 15%
AUC 0.822 0.804 0.991 0.996 0.919 0.986 0.993
F1 0.528 0.511 0.897 0.955 0.941 0.901 0.941
Table 4: F1 scores for MNIST dataset. The scores were obtained for different
anomaly percentages using porotocol 1 by taking the normal class as the positive
one.
anomaly percentage ALOCC LOF DRAE GPND DAE ARAE
[27] [4] [37] [25]
10 0.97 0.92 0.95 0.983 0.978 0.977
20 0.92 0.83 0.91 0.971 0.959 0.965
30 0.92 0.72 0.88 0.961 0.945 0.95
40 0.91 0.65 0.82 0.95 0.926 0.938
50 0.88 0.55 0.73 0.939 0.9 0.925
Table 5: FPR for 99.5% TPR of MNIST dataset.
Method 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
DAE 0.089 0.014 0.581 0.603 0.565 0.642 0.194 0.541 0.902 0.233
ARAE 0.028 0.010 0.562 0.269 0.457 0.361 0.070 0.495 0.818 0.182
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Fig. 3: Left: F1 scores for the MNIST dataset. Right: FPR at 99.5% TPR of the
MNIST dataset.
4.3 Ablation
In addition to the ℓ∞ perturbation set, we consider ℓ2, and also rotation and
translation perturbation sets. We need to solve a similar optimization to the one
in Eq. 4, with the only difference being the perturbation sets [9]. Specifically, we
solve this optimization problem on ℓ2-bounded perturbations for each sample
X ∈ S through PGD [20] again. We next solve this optimization on rotation and
translation perturbation sets for each sampleX ∈ S by quantizing the parameter
space, and performing a grid search on the quantized space and choosing the
one with the highest latent loss. This is the most reliable approach for solving
rotation and translation perturbations that is mentioned in [9]. Following the
approach in [32], we use the union of these perturbation sets to make the attack
even stronger to avoid as much as brittle features that model might use [15]. We
present our results for MNIST in Table 6. This variant of our method is denoted
as ARAE-A. Notably, the AUC is improved further in this variant in the most
challenging class 8 in MNIST from 93.9 based on ℓ∞ attack to 95.6 using the
union of the mentioned attacks. Despite this improvement, the average AUC is
still the same as in the original ARAE method.
Table 6: AUC values for the MNIST dataset. Results for other variants of our
method are reported.
Method 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Mean
DAE 99.6 99.9 93.9 93.5 96.4 94.3 99.0 95.8 89.1 97.5 95.9
ARAE 99.8 99.9 96.0 97.2 97.0 97.4 99.5 96.9 92.4 98.5 97.5
ARAE-A 99.1 99.7 95.2 96.7 97.7 98.3 99.2 97.1 95.6 96.8 97.5
ARAE-R 99.3 99.9 93.2 92.5 96.2 96.6 99.3 97.3 91.2 98.2 96.4
Instead of designing the attack based on the latent layer, one could directly
use the reconstruction loss to do so. We denote this variant as ARAE-R. However,
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we observed that a model that is robust to the latter attack yields a lower
improvement compared to ARAE (see Table 6). To justify this effect, we note
that an AE model that is robust based on the latter attack does not necessarily
have a stable latent layer. This stems from the fact that the encoder and decoder
are almost inverse functions by construction, and a destabilization of the latent
encoding by an attack could be repressed by the decoder. In summary, an attack
based on the latent layer is stronger than an attack based on the reconstruction
error, and hence the former promotes more robust features.
5 Visualization
Input DAE rec. DAE map ARAE rec. ARAE map
Fig. 4: ARAE and DAE reconstructions and saliency maps for five random inputs
in MNIST dataset.
In the experiments section, we showed that our method achieves state-of-
the-art results on three mentioned datasets. In order to demonstrate the reasons
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Input DAE rec. DAE map ARAE rec. ARAE map
Fig. 5: ARAE and DAE reconstructions and saliency maps for five random inputs
in Fashion-MNIST dataset.
behind these results, we show that ARAE learns more semantically meaningful
features than DAE by interpreting these two approaches.
5.1 Interpreting with Occlusion-1
In this method, we measure the effect of each part of the input on the output,
by occluding it and observing the difference in the output. Finally, we visualize
these differences as a saliency map [3, 41]. In the occlusion-1 method, we iter-
atively set each pixel to black and then observe the reconstruction error. If it
increases, we set the corresponding pixel in the saliency map to blue, and oth-
erwise we set it to red. The intensity of a pixel is determined by the amount
that the reconstruction error has changed. Here, we compare ARAE and DAE
reconstructions and saliency maps on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets.
In Fig. 4, the model has been trained on the class 8 of MNIST dataset and
noisy inputs are obtained by adding a uniform noise in the interval [0, 0.4]. The
outputs and saliency maps of ARAE and DAE are shown for five random inputs
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in the normal class. It is evident that DAE is focusing too much on the random
noises and has a poorer reconstruction than our model.
ARAE DAE
Fig. 6: Local minima of inputs of ARAE and DAE, by initializing the input with
a random noise and optimizing the reconstruction loss with respect to the input.
ARAE produces more realistic 8 digits compared to DAE.
Similar to MNIST, we carry out the occlusion-1 method on the class dress in
the Fashion-MNIST dataset. The results are shown in Fig. 5. In Fashion-MNIST,
it is also obvious that random noises have a larger effect on the output of DAE.
Furthermore, DAE reconstructions are less accurate than those of ARAE. These
observations are consistent with the known fact that adversarial robustness can
increase the model interpretability [34] by avoiding the learning of brittle features
[15].
5.2 Local Minima Visualization
We expect from an ideal model that is trained on the MNIST class 8 to have
lower reconstruction error as the input gets more similar to a typical 8. With this
motivation, we start from a random noise and iteratively modify it in order to
minimize the reconstruction error using gradient descent. The results achieved
by our model and DAE are shown in Fig. 6. This figure demonstrates that inputs
that lead to local minima in ARAE are much more similar to 8 than in DAE.
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6 Conclusions
We introduced a variant of AE based on the robust adversarial training for
novelty detection. This is motivated by the goal of learning representations of
the input that are almost robust to small irrelevant adversarial changes in the
input. A series of novelty detection experiments were performed to evaluate the
proposed AE. Our experimental results of the proposed ARAE model show state-
of-the-art performance on three publicly available datasets. This suggests that
the benefits of adversarial robustness indeed go beyond security. Furthermore,
by performing an ablation study, we discussed the effect of multiple perturbation
sets on the model. Future work inspired by this observation could investigate the
effect of other types of adversarial attacks in the proposed framework.
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